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State v. Zunick: Second Guessing a First Impression
James Murnion
I. INTRODUCTION
State v. Zunick1 presented the Montana Supreme Court with a
question of first impression: what constitutes a proper colloquy under
Montana Code Annotated § 46–12–211(4), and when must the colloquy
occur?2 This statute governs the process of when a district court judge
refuses to accept the terms of a plea agreement following the entry of a
guilty plea.3 Specifically at issue in this case is the statute’s requirement
that the court allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea following a deviation from the agreed-upon sentence.4
This note first examines how a defendant could historically
withdraw a plea of guilty under Montana Code Annotated § 46–16–
105(2). Then, following an examination of the factual and procedural
history in Zunick, this note analyzes how these two statutes may stand in
relation to each other. However, because the Court in Zunick never
addressed § 46–16–105(2), we are ultimately left in the dark as to the
true understanding of how these two statutes are connected, if at all.
II. HISTORY
Traditionally, a district court may permit the withdrawal of a
guilty plea upon a showing of good cause.5 The Court has noted that
“good cause” includes the minimal constitutional requirement that a
guilty plea be made intelligently and voluntarily.6 Montana uses the
Supreme Court’s voluntariness standard laid out in Brady v. United
States:7
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the
direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or
his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats
(or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
1

State v. Zunick, ___ P.3d ___, 2014 WL 4432601 (Mont. 2014).
Id. at *3.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–211(4) (2013).
4
Id.
5
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–105(2).
6
State v. Deserly, 188 P.3d 1057, 1060 (Mont. 2008), overruled on different grounds by State v.
Brinson, 210 P.3d 164 (Mont. 2009).
7
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
2
3
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nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).8
However, involuntariness alone is not enough to satisfy the good cause
requirement: “Involuntariness and discovery of new exculpatory
evidence constitute good cause for withdrawal of a plea . . . but others
may exist.”9 Section 46–16–105(2) also allows good cause if there is “a
claim of innocence . . . supported by evidence of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.”10
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2012, Missoula County sheriffs found Zunick
and his car in a ditch.11 The officers observed that he was visibly
intoxicated and arrested him.12 Zunick admitted to being drunk, and back
at the detention center his blood alcohol was measured at 0.202.13 Zunick
was charged with criminal endangerment and aggravated driving under
the influence.14
On March 13, 2012, Zunick pleaded not guilty to both counts.15
On June 19, 2012, and with advisement of counsel, Zunick made a plea
agreement with the State pursuant to § 46–12–211(1)(b).16 The State
agreed to seek a sentence of six years, with three years suspended, for the
criminal endangerment and one year suspended for the DUI.17 At the
change of plea hearing, the district court informed Zunick that the court
was not bound by the terms of the agreement, but if the court chose not
to follow the sentencing recommendations, Zunick would be afforded the
chance to withdraw his plea(s) of guilty.18
On September 4, 2012, the district court sentenced Zunick to ten
years suspended with the conditions laid out in the plea agreement.19 The
court explained its reasoning for not imposing the recommended
sentence: a longer sentence with no actual incarceration better suits
Zunick because he is raising a seven-year old daughter.20 The court then
asked Zunick if he had any questions about the conditions and if he
agreed with the sentence.21 Zunick stated that he understood and agreed
8

Deserly, 188 P.3d at 1060 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).
Id. (emphasis added).
10
Id.
11
Zunick, at *1.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Zunick at *1.
18
Id. at *3.
19
Id. at *1.
20
Id. at *3.
21
Id. at *1.
9
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with the sentence.22 The court did not explicitly tell Zunick it was
rejecting the plea agreement nor did the court allow him an opportunity
to withdraw his plea.23
On March 26, 2013, Zunick violated a condition of his
suspended sentence when he drove without permission from his
probation officer.24 On May 24, 2013, Zunick moved the district court to
change this condition; the court denied the motion on June 18, 2013.25
On September 17, 2013, Zunick moved to withdraw his guilty plea,
alleging that the court failed to comply with § 46–12–211(4).26 Upon
rejecting a (1)(b) plea agreement, this statute requires the court to: (1)
inform the parties it is rejecting the agreement; (2) advise the defendant
that the court is not bound by the agreement; (3) afford the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw his plea; and (4) advise the defendant that the
disposition of the case may be less favorable than that contemplated in
the agreement.27 On October 28, 2013, the court denied Zunick’s motion
to withdraw his plea; Zunick appealed from that decision.28
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
In a 4–1 decision, the Court held the full advisory provisions of
§ 46–12–211(4) must be expressly given by the judge when the plea
agreement is rejected.29 A district court cannot, as it did in Zunick’s case,
give the advisory warnings in a piecemeal fashion during multiple
hearings.30 To reach this decision, the Court relied upon a principle of
statutory construction contained in Montana Code Annotated § 1–2–101,
which states that where a statute has several particulars, the judge should
adopt a construction that gives meaning to all.31 The statute at issue in
this case reads “[i]f the court rejects a plea agreement . . . the court shall,
on the record [provide the four advisories].”32 The Court stated that the
only reasonable statutory interpretation requires these advisories to be
given at the time the plea agreement is actually rejected; advisories given
before this time do not satisfy the statute.33 Because the district court did
not give the full advisories at the time it rejected the plea agreement, the
district court’s ruling was reversed.34 Zunick’s sentence was vacated and
22

Id.
Zunick at *3.
Id. at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–411(4).
28
Zunick at *2.
29
Id. at *4.
30
Id. at *3.
31
Id.
32
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–211(4).
33
Zunick at *3.
34
Id. at *4.
23
24
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the trial judge was instructed to conduct another sentencing hearing.35
The court may again either accept or reject the agreement; if it rejects the
agreement, it must give the full advisory and allow Zunick an
opportunity to withdraw his plea.36 If the court accepts the agreement,
then it must impose the sentence in that agreement.37
V. MCGRATH’S DISSENT
The lone dissenter, Justice McGrath, took a more traditional
view of guilty plea withdrawal. He argued Zunick not only understood
the terms of his sentence, but he explicitly agreed with its terms at the
sentencing hearing.38 Additionally, Zunick did not make the necessary
good cause showing required to withdraw a plea of guilty, “[h]e simply
found the conditions advantageous, until he didn’t.”39 McGrath
essentially argued, as the district court did, that we should give
precedence to substance over form regarding the sentencing hearing.40
VI. ANALYSIS
In Zunick, the Court never mentioned the necessary good cause
showing under § 46–16–105(2), despite the fact both parties addressed
this statute in their briefs.41 The facts make it clear that Zunick
voluntarily entered his plea of guilty under the Brady test, making a
traditional good cause showing difficult at best.42 Instead, the Court
relied solely on § 46–12–211(4) to reach its decision.43 The question thus
becomes, how do these two statutes relate to one another?
One possibility is that a district court’s failure to give the full
advisories pursuant to § 46–12–211(4) constitutes good cause for the
purposes of § 46–16–105(2). In fact, the Court suggested just that in
State v. Lone Elk:44 “fair and just reasons for withdrawal of guilty plea
include an inadequate colloquy.”45 However, an improper colloquy was
not the issue in Lone Elk; the statement that an unsatisfactory colloquy is
good cause under § 46–16–105(2) was mere dicta.46

35

Id.
Id.
37
Zunick at *4
38
Id. at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting).
39
Id.
40
Id. at *2 (majority).
41
Appellant’s Opening Br., State v. Zunick, 2014 WL 832813 at *5 (Mont. Feb. 18, 2014) (No. DA
13-0812); Appellee’s Br., State v. Zunick, 2014 WL 2198009 at *5 (Mont. May 14, 2014) (No. DA
13-0812).
42
Zunick at *1.
43
Id. at *4.
44
State v. Lone Elk, 108 P.3d 500 (Mont. 2005).
45
Id. at 505 (citing United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1990)).
46
Id.
36
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The second possibility, and the more plausible one, is that the
relation between the two statutes is nearly nonexistent. Justice McGrath’s
dissent does not mention § 46–16–105(2).47 Yet he does argue that
despite an inadequate colloquy under § 46–12–211(4), Zunick should not
have been granted relief.48 Surely if an inadequate colloquy is good cause
then Justice McGrath could not make this argument. The majority also
fails to address good cause, even though it would make their argument
even stronger: the district court failed to provide a proper colloquy,
therefore Zunick had good cause to withdraw his plea. Both the majority
and the dissenting opinions strongly suggest that an inadequate colloquy
pursuant to § 46–12–211(4) does not constitute good cause under § 46–
16–105(2).49 Nonetheless, because the issue was not discussed in Zunick,
we are unfortunately left to wonder how the Court views the relationship
between the two statutes.
The Court’s decision also has unfortunate implications for Mr.
Zunick. If the Court ruled an inadequate colloquy is good cause to
withdraw a plea of guilty, then it could have granted Zunick’s motion to
withdraw his plea, and he would presumably go to trial. Yet because the
case was ruled entirely under § 46–12–211(4), the remedy sidesteps
Zunick’s request to withdraw his guilty plea and essentially rewinds the
trial process to the point where the error was made: the sentencing
hearing.50 Thus, even though Zunick “won” the case, the Court did not
grant his motion (the denial of which being the basis of his appeal).51 The
overturned district court may now impose the original plea agreement
sentence, which includes three years of incarceration.52 If the court does
impose this sentence, Zunick will not be able to withdraw his plea unless
he can show good cause, which is fairly unlikely given the current
analysis. To be fair, Zunick never specifically argued that an inadequate
colloquy constitutes good cause under § 46–15–105(2). Perhaps if he did,
the Court could have taken on the issue, and Zunick could have been
granted the relief he was actually seeking.

47

Zunick at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting).
Id.
49
Id. at **3–4 (majority).
50
Id. at *4.
51
Id.
52
Zunick at *4.
48

